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WHY THEY SAY “NO” (CASI—“NO”):
COUNTRIES THAT REJECT LEGALIZED
CASINO GAMBLING
William N. Thompson*
INTRODUCTION
Most world venues have legalized casino gambling.  Indeed, the numbers
of venues has been growing rapidly.  In 1986, seventy-seven nations permitted
legal casino gambling; in 1996, 109; while recent reports indicate 132 countries
have casinos.1  Nonetheless, there are several cases of jurisdictions rejecting
the legalization of casinos.
This article seeks to find common reasons for the rejections, and examines
the following ten venues: Bhutan, Brazil, Japan, Liechtenstein, Iceland, India,
Ireland, Israel, Mexico, and Norway.  The study utilizes a framework from the
book The Last Resort: Success and Failure in Campaigns for Casinos, by John
Dombrink and William N. Thompson.2  The authors developed a “Veto Model”
for explaining why American states rejected casinos in the decades before
1990.  Major veto factors influencing casino campaign outcomes included: (1)
the economic conditions and state experiences with gambling, (2) the position
of political and business elites, and other gaming interests; (3) campaign spon-
sorship; and (4) whether the dominant issue in a campaign was economics or
crime and social problems.  For successful campaigns (e.g. Atlantic City,
1976), all factors had to be supportive of casinos.
The model is adaptable for worldwide study.  As such, the factors were
first presented in a study of Ireland published by the UNLV Gaming Law Jour-
nal in its Volume 1, Issue 1 edition.  “Luck of the Irish: Will the Casinos Trans-
form from Gaelic Grey to Gaelic Green $$” presented the following veto
factors: (1) personality factors; (2) poverty; (3) government corruption; (4)
ambient violence; (5) lack of nearby casinos; (6) religious opposition; and (7)
competition from rival interests.  This article presents case studies for the ten
venues.  Each venue features at least one of these veto factors, with poverty,
religious opposition, lack of nearby casinos, and rival interests being the most
salient.
* Professor Emeritus of Public Administration, School of Environmental and Public Affairs,
University of Nevada Las Vegas, Las Vegas 89154-4030, 477-5432, william.thompson@
unlv.edu.
1 WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GAMBLING, xviii (2010).
2 JOHN DOMBRINK & WILLIAM THOMPSON, THE LAST RESORT: SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN
CAMPAIGNS FOR CASINOS (1990).
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I. OVERVIEW: VICTORIES AND DEFEATS IN EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE
CASINOS—THE CRITICAL GATEKEEPING MILESTONE
FOR ONE INDUSTRY
In its legal contexts, gambling is critically different than other commercial
enterprises.  However, the essence of gambling operations is similar to other
businesses because it involves details of property law, contract law, torts and
product liability.  Since the cessation of alcoholic prohibition in the United
States, and many other nations in the early twentieth century, this one basic
prescription—“Is the business legal?”—has not been placed upon any other
business activity as it has been placed on gambling.  Gambling entities can
openly succeed only where they may operate under the positive expression of
legal authority—constitutional, legislative, and regulatory authority.  This arti-
cle examines legal permissions and prohibitions of the most visible of commer-
cial gambling establishments—the casino.  Virtually no other industry finds its
very existence so dependent upon the nexus of the legal and political forces
considered here.  The basic question asked is “why do some venues continue
prohibition of casino gambling?”
Most world venues have legalized casino gambling.  Indeed, the number
of casino venues has been growing rapidly.  In 1986, there were seventy-seven
casinos worldwide.  This article focuses on the following ten venues: Bhutan,
Brazil, Japan, Liechtenstein, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Mexico, and Nor-
way (“the ten venues”).  Left off the list are Islamic nations where religious
condemnation of gambling dominates policy decisions regarding casinos.  In
countries of the Arabic and Islamic world, the few casinos permitted, do not
allow play by local residents, or in the case of Malaysia, local Muslim
residents.3  Also, the study does not consider enclave states and venues where
other jurisdictions maintain a notable degree of control over their policy mak-
ing.  Examples include: Hong Kong, San Marino, Andorra, Samoa and Guam,
as well as some smaller island countries (e.g., Barbados, The Caymans, [south-
ern] Cyprus).  China is excluded, as it now should be, in that its enclave Macao
is a major casino center.  Places that have tolerated open casinos, or have had
them on an “off and on” basis, such as Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela, Sri
Lanka and Turkey, are also excluded from the study.  The ten venues this arti-
cle focuses on allow forms of legalized gambling with horse racing in some
(e.g., India, Japan, Mexico, and Norway), and lotteries or machine gaming in
most.  While restricting public access, a few of the ten venues permit casino
operations on a private member basis only.4  Of the ten venues, most have
witnessed active campaigns for legalization, and for instance, in Ireland, Japan,
and Mexico, the campaigns remain “hopeful.”
3 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 379-80.
4 See id. at 364-70, 446-50, 469-71, 490-91, 506-07, 513-17; Liechtenstein Gambling,
WORLD GAMBLING REV., http://onlinecasinosuite.com/gambling/Liechtenstein (last visited
Sept. 26, 2010).
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II. VETO FACTORS DEFEAT CASINO LEGALIZATIONS:
AMERICAN AND IRISH MODELS
The Last Resort developed a “Veto Model” explaining why American
states rejected casinos before 1990.5  Major factors influencing casino cam-
paign outcomes included: (1) economic conditions in the state and state experi-
ence with legalized gambling; (2) the position of political elites, business elites,
and other gaming interests; (3) campaign sponsorship; and (4) whether the
dominant issue was rooted in economics or social problems.6  For the cam-
paigns to be successful,7 all factors had to weigh in favor of adoption: the state
had to be facing difficult economic times, major elites and rival gaming inter-
ests had to support (or at least not oppose) the proposition for casino develop-
ment, and sponsors had to be legitimate and have financial resources far above
those of opponents.8  Moreover, rather than crime or other social problems such
as compulsive gambling, the predominant issue driver had to be economic
benefits.9
While the “Veto Model” is an appropriate point of reference explaining
why casino efforts failed in the ten venues, the list of veto factors impacting the
ten venues is distinguishable from those impacting U.S. states.  The study of
Irish casino efforts readily provides seven factors relevant to developing casi-
nos in the ten venues: (1) personality factors; (2) poverty; (3) government cor-
ruption; (4) ambient violence; (5) lack of nearby casinos; (6) religious
opposition; and (7) competition from rival interests.10  The factors will be
referred to below as “Worldwide Veto Model” factors.
1. Personality and the “All In” Spirit
Political leaders feel a need to “protect” the Irish common folk from their
own foibles—notably a desire to “fight on” regardless of the odds against
them.11  A spirit which won independence for the land may not be so desirable
at casino gaming tables.  Indeed, they might be tied to addictive behaviors.12
2. Poverty
Successful casinos exploit markets.  Markets are comprised of people with
money.  A population engulfed by poverty must focus its energy upon finding
resources for daily life—housing, food, necessities; there is neither time nor
resources for leisure pursuits, especially those requiring the investment of
5 DOMBRINK & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 93-97.
6 Id. at 94-95.
7 See e.g., id. at 29-37 (The successful 1976 New Jersey vote in favor of casinos for Atlantic
City).
8 Id. at 95-96.
9 Id. at 176-77.
10 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 132-38.
11 Id. at 132-33.
12 Id.
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money.  A government official offered that the law against casino gambling
existed so that the poor would not be enticed to waste their limited resources.13
3. Corruption in Politics and Legalized Casinos
The political attention span of Ireland did not leave much time for things
other than nationalism until recent years of prosperity.14  The consumption of
the public mind with “what it is to be Irish,” caused a neglect of efficiency and
honesty in public affairs.15  During Ireland’s first decades of independence,
localism, nepotism, and outright corruption left its mark.  Casino gambling
presented a major threat to good government, and was rejected as a factor
adding to bad practices.16
4. A Culture of Violence
People with wealth avoid places where their resources may be observed, if
they feel that they could become victims of foul play.17  A culture of violence,
as found in Irish history, is incompatible with casino development.18
5. No Need to Defend Borders from Neighboring Casinos
A primary rationale promoters use to win legalization is that neighboring
venues have casinos, and as a result, are taking “our” money away.19  But there
are no casinos in Ireland.  In fact, while Scotland, Wales, and England have the
nearest casinos, each one features only small operations catering to local, rather
than tourist populations.20
6. Religious Influence
In Ireland, the Catholic Church has dampened efforts to legalize casinos.21
The Church has been a major force in Irish politics.  In 1935, Taoiseach Eamon
de Valera stated: “Since the coming of St. Patrick, 1,500 years ago, Ireland has
been a Christian and a Catholic nation.  All the ruthless attempts made through
the centuries to force her from this allegiance have not shaken her faith.”22
Before the exposure of sex scandals involving clergy and children in the past
13 Id. at 133 (quoting an interview with Michael Walsh, Ireland Dep’t of Just., Equal. and
Law Reform, in Dublin, Ir. (Oct. 5, 2007)).
14 Deirdre Hennessey, A Study of Political Corruption in Twentieth Century Ireland (2004),
(unpublished B.A. Dissertation. Univ. College, Cork (Ir.)); see generally DAVID MCWIL-
LIAMS, THE POPE’S CHILDREN (2005).
15 Hennessey, supra note 14.
16 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 134-35.
17 Id. at 135-36 (discusses how terrorism in Basque Country, Spain, negatively impacted the
profits of the casino in San Sebastian.  The unstable security situation throughout Europe in
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century severely affected casino development
in that part of the world).
18 Id.
19 See generally id. at 518-98 (discusses how the factor of legalization of  casinos in one
U.S. state would propel the legalization of casinos in an adjacent state).
20 Id. at 136.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 137.
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two decades, the views of the Catholic Church leaders were not openly
challenged.23
7. Competitive Businesses that Wish to Suppress Casinos: Gaming and
Non-Gaming
The addition of casinos could compromise the success of several existing
Irish entertainment businesses.  Two interests led policy makers away from
legalizing casinos: Irish pubs and betting shops.24  There are 11,000 privately-
owned pubs in Ireland (three times the number per person as in England).25
Betting shops emerged in the 1920s.26  There are 1,100 licensed betting shops,
and they are growing in numbers.27  Many of the shops are owned by major
companies.28
The previous study of Ireland developed seven factors, which will be used
when analyzing why each of the ten venues have rejected legalized casino gam-
bling.  The Worldwide Veto Model’s veracity for explaining the rejection of
casinos will be tested through an examination of events in each of the ten
venues.  The analysis that follows will assess each factor, and review the total-
ity of factors for each venue.  At the conclusion of the discussion, the analysis
will review the model to gain a sense of its efficacy, and to seek an understand-
ing of precisely which factors in the model have the greatest saliency for deter-
mining the likely demise of casino legalization policies.
III. THE IRISH EXPERIENCE: VETO FACTORS DISSIPATE,
VETO FACTORS PERSIST
In Ireland the force of the factors identified in the Veto Model have been
dissipating in recent decades.29  For instance, following the Easter Peace
Accord of 1998,30 the Irish economy blossomed as a computer industry flour-
ished at the turn of the century,31 the Catholic Church lost political influence
amidst revelations of misconduct by priests,32 and interests rivaling casinos
have either embraced more gambling (sports betting shops) or they themselves
have lost political clout (the pubs).33  Nonetheless, the forces pushing for legal-
ized casinos have been stymied as concerns over corruption and the penchant
23 MCWILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 232-33.
24 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 137-38.
25 Id. at 138.
26 Gov’t of Ir., Dep’t of Just., Equal. & Law Reform, Review of the Gaming and Lotteries
Acts 1956-1986, at 9 (2000).
27 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 137-38 (citing William N. Thompson, Will Ireland Legalize
Casinos in 2008?, 4 CASINO LAW. 12, 14 (2008)).
28 Id. at 138 n.195.
29 Id. at 138-39.
30 The Easter Peace Accord of 1998 muted violence between Catholics and Protestants in
Northern Ireland after decades of violent struggle between them. MCWILLIAMS, supra note
14, at 228-30.
31 Sean Dorgan, How Ireland Became the Celtic Tiger, BACKGROUNDER 8, 12 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.heritage.org/research.
32 MCWILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 232-33.
33 Id.
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for the Irish personality to “not give up,” that is, to overindulge in the activity
of the moment, persists.34
As a matter of policy-making strategy, Ireland’s officials are conducting
studies and issuing various “white papers” on the subject of gaming reform.35
The thrust of their efforts seem to advocate a comprehensive overhaul of all
laws dating back to the establishment of a national sweepstakes in 1931,36 and
the Irish Gaming and Lotteries Act of 1956,37 as well as to advocate for a
meaningful and effective law to deal with internet gambling services.38  In their
quest to “bite off” everything they wish to chew, policy makers may confront
one another with a realization that it is “too much to chew” at one time, and
accordingly, they may fall into a pattern of delaying action.
As we will see in this article, policy makers in several other venues are
also bitten by the “manana” (that is, a “wait until tomorrow”) bug, including
Mexico, Brazil, and Japan.  Leaders in the venues often talk vigorously about
issues, but then find it inconvenient to resolve issues by making actual deci-
sions.  The stories below illustrate how each venue employs this delaying strat-
egy along with the seven veto factors in a generalized refusal to accept the
legalization of casinos.39
IV. BHUTAN
Bhutan is a small isolated land-locked country located at the end of the
Himalayas, bordering the Indian state Sikkim and Tibet, China.  The population
of 690,000 displays lifestyles that have not changed much over many centuries.
Of the population, seventy-five percent are Buddhists, and the remaining
Hindu.40  Bhutan holds its national identity and cultural heritage in such high
regard that they severely restrict outside influences.41  One result of this restric-
tion is that tourism, while important, is also very limited.42  The economy is
largely tied to India’s economy, as citizens of each country have free access to
the other.  A major portion of the nation’s exports go to India, with hydroelec-
tric power being the leading product.43
Bhutan reveres national isolation as a means of preserving not only local
values, but also “happiness.”  In 1972, the King of Bhutan stated the country’s
34 See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 132-35.
35 See e.g., Casino Committee, Dep’t of Just., Equal. & Law Reform, Regulating Gaming in
Ireland (2008).
36 Id.
37 Gaming and Lotteries Act 1956 § 4 (Act. No. 2/1956) (Ir.), available at http://222.irish-
statutebook.ie/1956/en/pub/0002.index.html (amended in 1979, Act 6, to set prize limits).
38 Katie Byrne, Att’y at Law, A & L Goodbody, UK to Germany via Greece: A Journey
Across Some European Jurisdiction in Change at IMGL 2011 Spring Conference (May 24,
2011); Interview with Grainne Bolger, Assistant Principal Officer, Dep’t of Justice Equality
and Law Reform, in Dublin, Ir. (Oct. 5, 2007).
39 Byrne, supra note 38.
40 Bhutan, in CIA WORLD FACT BOOK 2011, at 699 (2010); see CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS,
CAMBRIDGE FACT FINDER 214-15 (David Crystal ed. 1993); see also Bhutan Gambling,
WORLD GAMBLING REV., http://wwwonlinecasinosuite.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
41 Bhutan Gambling, supra note 40.
42 FRANCOISE POMMARET, BHUTAN: HIMALAYAN MOUNTAIN KINGDOM 14 (2003).
43 CIA WORLD FACT BOOK, supra note 40, at 77-78.
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success was not measured by its “Gross National Product,” but rather “Gross
National Happiness.”44  Isolation has served this goal.  Along with counting
currency in economic transactions, the government’s Centre for Bhutan Studies
uses surveys to measure the “level of well-being” of the population.45  Cross-
national surveys built on a Bhutanese format have found that on scales of “hap-
piness,” Bhutan ranks comparatively near the top in the world.46  The country
wants to keep things that way.47
Governmental policies have been consistent with the King’s desires and
those of his people.  For instance, television has been permitted only since
1999.  Bhutan is the only country in the world to ban smoking.  The environ-
ment is a major national concern.  Happiness does not mean that the govern-
ment frowns on all things celebratory, quite to the contrary.  There are no
serious threats to national security, so the approximate 6,000 troops in the mili-
tary spend more time distilling alcoholic beverages than going through military
drills.48  Moreover, during its many holidays and festivals, Bhutan’s residents
enjoy copious amounts of alcohol consumption and “tolerated gambling.”49
Notably, residents engage in recreational gaming, and even serious wagering in
homes throughout the country—quite illegally, but also quite openly.50
With the exception of lotteries, gambling is illegal.  In 1978 gambling was
banned, and persons participating in games were subject to prison terms rang-
ing from a month to a year.51  However, no efforts were made to enforce the
law for the following two decades.52  But even after enforcement began, people
continued to participate in games at private residences where law enforcement
officers were reluctant to impede—especially when those residences were often
the homes of leading government officials.53  A state-run lottery has been
established, and in 2004 a Department of the Lottery was created.54  Bhutan
lottery tickets were freely sold in India, but when the state of Sikkim began
selling tickets in Bhutan, the government protested.55  Subsequently, negotia-
44 Nadia Mustafa, What About Gross National Happiness, TIME HEALTH (Jan. 10, 2005),
www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1016266,00.hmtl.
45 Centre for Bhutan Studies, Gross National Happiness Pre-Test Questionnaire #3 Novem-
ber 2007, http://grossnationalhappiness.com/GNHSurvey/gnhquestionnaire.pdf.
46 Bhutan Gambling, supra note 39; see generally ERIC WEINER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF BLISS
49-95 (2008).
47 POMMARET, supra note 42, at 14-15.
48 Bhutan, LYCOS RETRIEVER, http://www.lycos.com/info/Bhutan.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2011); Catching a Buzz in Bhutan, CHAMPACA JOURNEYS (July 13, 2010), http:champaca
journeys.com/catching_a_buzz.html.
49 Kinzang Choden, When Gambling Habit Takes Root, BHUTAN OBSERVER (Feb. 21,
2009), http://bhutanobserver.bt/when-gambling-habit-takes-root/.
50 Id.
51 Rinzin Wangchuk, Another Ban on Gambling, KUENSEL NEWSPAPER (Jan. 16, 2007),
www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=7970.
52 Gambling Away, BHUTAN OBSERVER (Nov. 11, 2011), www.bhutanobserver.bt/gambling.
53 See Wangchuk, supra note 51.
54 Ministry of Finance, Bhutan History, www.mof.gov.bt/index.php?deptid=2 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2011).
55 Jay Sayta, Recent Kerala HC Decision on Lotteries, GAMBLING LAWS IN INDIA (Nov. 4,
2010), http://glaws.in/2010/11/recent-kerala-hc-decision-on-lotteries/.
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tions allowed trade routes between Sikkim to open.56  Indian lottery operators
seized the moment and began selling a lottery called Playwin.57  This Mumbai-
based online lotto game enticed much play to the consternation of Bhutan offi-
cials.58  Bhutan imposed very high taxes on the game causing it to close down
marketing in 2007.59  The King of Bhutan also abdicated his throne in 2006,
and the following year, the nation established a parliamentary democracy.60
The lottery and other gambling has remained an issue of contention for the new
policy makers.  However, they have not seen fit to authorize and license casi-
nos.  This issue has not been presented for consideration.
On the other hand, casino activity has been initiated in nearby Sikkim.
Not very long after the formerly separate protectorate became a state of India in
1975, it set its eyes on casino gaming.  The Sikkim Casino Games Act was
passed in 2004 and four years later a small, fifteen table casino opened within
the Indian state.61
The Worldwide Veto Model provides a few salient factors for analysis
here.  Bhutan’s central religious ideologies have not operated as a barrier to
casino development.  Religions emphasize tolerance.  Prior to the advent of
democratic rule, the King had no desire for gambling activity to exist in Bhu-
tan.  Yet his adherence to Buddhist principles led him (and the police) to be
tolerant of the limited gambling activities in which his subjects engaged.62
There is a developing network of home casinos in which many citizens,
indeed leading citizens, participate.  Gambling activity brings funds into many
households—including those of several high officials.  This “private” activity
represents a major competitive force standing against efforts for legalization of
state-controlled casinos.  At the same time home-based gambling is not availa-
ble for tourists, and tourism is a minor activity.  In any event, the Bhutanese
government does not appear interested in encouraging tourism through
gambling.
The new casinos of Sikkim may appeal to some Bhutan residents, but
roads and transportation are very rugged and uninviting between the regions of
Bhutan and Sikkim.  Casinos have not been close to Bhutan’s borders before,
and the Sikkim facilities are unlikely to entice members of a new parliament to
welcome casinos.  Leaders of Bhutan may seek to protect their citizens, not out
56 Amiti Sen, Sikkim to Gain Most as Trade via Nethula Takes Off, THE ECON. TIMES (July
12, 2006, 2:51AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2006-07-12/news/274217
80_1_nathula-trade-basket-border-trade.
57 Wangchuck, supra note 51.
58 Tenzing Lamsang, Bhutan Cuts Ties with Lottery Don Santiago Martin, BUS. BHUTAN
(May 6, 2011), http://www.businessbhutan.bt/?p=5863.
59 Bhutan Gambling, supra note 40.
60 Bhutanese King Steps Down Early, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/
6184349.stm (last updated Dec. 15, 2006); Mehdi Hassan, Bhutan’s New King, SOUTH ASIA
BIZ. (Dec. 16, 2006), http://www.southasiabiz.com/2006/12/bhutans_new_king.html.
61 Sikkim all Set to Roll, INDIAN REALTY NEWS, http://www.indiarealitynews.com/real-
estate-india/sikkim-all-set-to-roll-its-roullette-for-great-gamblers.html (last visited Sept. 12,
2011); see also Features, CASINO MAHJONG, SIKKIM, www.casinomahjongsikkim.com (last
visited Dec. 5, 2011).
62 For a discussion of Buddhism and tolerance see Daya Hewapathirane, Spirit of Tolerance,
Harmonisation and Assimilation in Buddhism (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.buddhistchan-
nel.tv/index.php?id=8,4808,0,0,1,0.
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of obligations to guard their happiness from addictions, but in recognition that
most are poor.  For all of these reasons, Bhutan is not likely to legalize com-
mercial casino games in the foreseeable future.
V. BRAZIL
Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world, both in population and in
land area.63  It is the largest country in Latin America, with a population of 190
million and a landmass slightly smaller than the forty-eight contiguous states of
the United States.64  The country boasts two of the world’s largest cities: Rio
de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo.65  In the early twenty-first century, the economy was
booming with expanding exports.  However, this situation is of recent duration
only.  For the latter years of the twentieth century, the country was economi-
cally weak and poverty levels were very high.66  Things did not improve much
until the 1990s.  In 1992, thirty-five percent of the population lived in poverty;
however, concerted governmental efforts have since pulled that number down
to sixteen percent in 2008.67  Nonetheless, poverty is pervasive, and there is a
wide gulf between the rich and the poor.68
Casino gambling is currently illegal in Brazil; however, the people partici-
pate in illegal casino-type games and several other forms of gambling.69  The
wealthy citizens of Brazil support casinos in the surrounding countries with
their business.70  Casinos near Brazil’s border are found in Argentina, Para-
guay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.71
Casino gambling was successful during the 1930s and 1940s; however, it
was banned by presidential decree in 1946 when a military coup established a
new reform government.72  Since then, remnants of casino-type games have
remained.  Video machines are prevalent in many bingo halls.73  Sports betting
and football pools are popular, as are cockfighting, horse racing, and all forms
of lotteries.74  A private lottery called jogo do bicho (“the animal game”) is
held to support the Mardi Gras carnival in Rio de Janeiro.75
63 Background Note: Brazil, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/ei/bgn/35640.htm.
64 Id.
65 CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS, supra note 40, at 217-18.
66 Bruno Bocchini, Brazil Believes it can Have Social Indicators of Rich Country in 6
Years, BRAZZILMAG (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.brazzilmag.com/component/content/article/
81-january-2010/11686-brazil-believes-it-can-have-social-indicators-of-rich-country-in-6-
years.html.
67 Focus Brazil, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 1, 2011, 15:14), www.economist.com/blogs/daily
chart/2011/11/focus.
68 OECD Secretariat, Growth, Employment and Inequality in Brazil, China, India and South
Africa: An Overview, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/59/45282661.pdf  (last visited Dec. 5,
2011).
69 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 490.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 508-12.
72 Id. at 490-91.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG203.txt unknown Seq: 10 10-JAN-12 16:03
204 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:195
Efforts to legalize casinos began to mount in the 1990s as a new democ-
racy replaced military rule.  In 1991, the efforts were narrowly defeated in the
national legislature.76  In 1995, a special study committee examined the ques-
tion of legalization.77  Nothing was done; the issue remains open and contro-
versial today.78
There is support for the reconsideration of legalizing casinos, but there is
also opposition.79  The government of President Lula de Silva was elected in
2002 and embraced an anti-gambling social reform posture.  President Lula de
Silva ordered the closing of hundreds of bingo halls in 2004.80  However, in
2005, the national senate reversed his decree and the halls reopened.81  The
Supreme Court in 2007 found that corrupt officials and organized crime ele-
ments were linked to bingo halls.82  The halls were closed down again; how-
ever, the issue remained unsettled.
The Lula de Silva government was active in seeking to control govern-
ment corruption, but it found the task to be a daunting one.  Corruption has
permeated governmental offices from the top down for generations.83  In addi-
tion, there is a strong anti-casino lobby led by Catholic Church forces advanc-
ing moral arguments.84  Lula’s successor in office, Dilma Rousseff, remains an
anti-casino force in Brazil’s government.  Casino legalization proponents per-
sist with their efforts, but they witnessed legislative defeats in both 2009 and
2010.85
Three veto factors have been most notable as resisting pressure to legalize
casinos: (1) the Catholic Church’s influence over legislation, (2) general con-
cern that casinos pose a threat to a relatively impoverished population, and (3)
the fact that many officials not adverse to bribery and corrupt activity, would
ultimately provide oversight to the casino industry.
VI. ICELAND
Iceland has 318,000 residents and occupies the second largest island in the
North Atlantic Ocean.86  The general policy is that gambling is illegal.  The
76 Larry Dandurand, Brazil, in GAMBLING IN AMERICA 29 (2001).
77 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 490-91.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Brazil: A Regulatory Report, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE, 5 (May 28, 2010), www.gambling
compliance.com/files/Brazil_Reg_Report.pdf.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See generally Claudia Ferraz & Frederico Finan, Preliminary Draft, Exposing Corrupt
Politicians: The Effect of Brazil’s Anti-Corruption Program on Electoral Outcomes (Apr.
2005), http://are.berkeley.edu/~sberto/AuditExp1.pdf; Stuart Grudgings, Analysis: Brazil’s
Rousseff Rides Anti-Graft Wave, for Now, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2011, 10:31AM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/11/07/us-brazil-corruption-idUSTRE7A63G420111107.
84 Dandurand, supra note 76, at 29.
85 Brazil Gambling Debate Shifts to Casinos, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (May 13, 2011),
www.gamblingcompliance.com/search/site/?f%BO%5D=im_7_field_geography%3A2.
86 Population, STATISTICS ICELAND, http://www.statice.is/Statistics/Population (last visited
Dec. 5, 2011); Iceland, NOVAMEDIA GAMING & LOTTERY FILES, http://www.gamingandlot-
teryfiles.com/novamediafile.php?file=Iceland.htm#1 (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).  Also, about
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country banned all lotteries in a 1926 parliamentary Act.87  In 1940, the parlia-
ment amended the criminal code to make it a “punishable offense” to engage in
gambling or to encourage others to do so.88  Essentially, individuals could no
longer receive income from gambling activities.89  Gains from gambling could
be confiscated, and the person engaging in gambling could be imprisoned for
up to one year, as could a person providing gambling facilities.90
But in Iceland, the exception is the rule, as reality is not consistent with
the general laws.  The Icelandic nation is a “gambling nation.”  The population
experienced gambling losses to the equivalent of  $99.6 million in 2005.  This
represents over $440 per adult, which is considerably more than gaming losses
of $350 per adult in the United States.91  The losses were from a variety of
lottery games, sports betting, slot machines, and bingo games.92
“Exceptions” to the general law on gambling began in 1933.  That year
Parliament authorized funding for the construction of a large building for the
University of Iceland.  However, the encroaching depression found the state
short of funds for the project.93  Lawmakers seized the moment and granted the
University permission to use a lottery to provide the capital necessary to finish
construction.94  Moreover, they allowed continuing games to finance more con-
struction and the purchase of research equipment.95  The University of Iceland
Lottery is the world’s only continuous lottery used for university financing.96
The University’s monopoly over lottery games soon came to an end.  First,
in 1949 the Association of Tuberculosis and Chest Patients won the right to
operate a lottery.97  Then, in 1954, the lottery privilege was extended to an
association for Elderly Seamans’ homes.98  Next, the Heart Association started
a lottery in 1959.99  Sports betting games followed in 1972, and slot machines
operated on behalf of the Red Cross and an Association for Search and Rescue
two-thirds of the population is over twenty years old. Iceland: Age Distribution,
NATIONMASTER, http://www.nationmaster.com/country/ic-iceland/Age-_distribution (last
visited Dec. 12, 2011).
87 Iceland Gambling, WORLD GAMBLING REV., http://onlinecasinosuite.com/gambling/ice-
land/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
88 GENERAL PENAL CODE NO. 19, Art. 183-184 (Feb. 12, 1940) (Ice.).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See Daniel Olason, Univ. of Iceland, Iceland: Gambling and Problem Gambling –
Results from the Icelandic Gambling Project at the 7th European Conference on Gambling
Studies and Policy Issues (July 2, 2008), available at http://www.easg.org/media.file/confer-
ences/novagorica2008/Wednesday/1400-ses2/olason_daniel.pdf.  The approximate exchange
rate at mid-year in 2005 was $1.20 dollars for one Euro.  US gambling figures from Thomp-
son, supra note 1.
92 See Olason, supra note 91.
93 Annemarie Prein & Fanka Pals, University of Iceland Lottery, NOVAMEDIA GAMING &
LOTTERY FILES, www.gamingandlotteryfiles.com/novamediafile.php?file=Iceland.htm#35
(last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
94 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 470.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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teams.100  There are now 600 machines in 280 locations throughout the coun-
try.101  In 1986, Parliament created a government enterprise called Islenk Get-
spa to conduct lotto games.102  The University of Iceland Lottery initiated the
use of online video lottery terminals for gambling in 1993.103  Today these
machines produce fifty-seven percent of the lottery’s revenue.104  In 2004, par-
liament permitted a website for interactive casino gaming.105
The “people pleasures” are enjoyed—perhaps to an excess.  The society is
reported to have heavy alcohol use.106  Over ninety percent of adults over
twenty years in age indulge in alcoholic beverages, often with weekend
binges.107  This behavior has been ongoing for generations, even while the
nation maintained a partial prohibition from 1915 until the 1980s.108
While strong in the past, religious influence has waned.  Although over
eighty percent of the population formally belongs to the national Lutheran
church, there is strong support for separation of church and state.109
The Icelandic people enjoyed a good economy prior to an economic col-
lapse in 2008.  Recently privatized banks overindulged in the world credit bub-
ble.  What was called “a casino economy,” which was in reference to reckless
government financial policies, had devastating economic consequences.  The
eruption of the Eyjafjallajo¨kull volcano in April 2010 also hurt the economy.
These economic disruptions have generated some feelings in favor of casino
development.110
In February 2010, two entrepreneurial brothers, both former football stars,
proposed that Parliament allow a casino in the Hotel Nordica, owned by Ice-
landic Airlines, in the capital of Reykjavik.111  The National Center of Addic-
tion Medicine opposed the idea, as they feared that a casino would add to
problems with addiction in the country.112  The brothers countered with the
notion that the casino could be open only to tourists from other countries.113
As the proposal was put forth to the administration, it received swift opposition
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id
106 See Ministry of Health & Social Security, The Icelandic National Health Plan to the
Year 2010, at 9 (May 20, 2001), http://eng.velferdarraduneyti.is/media/Skyrslur/heilben-
ska5mai.pdf.
107 Id.
108 See Helgi Gunnlaugsson & John F. Galliher, Prohibition of Beer in Iceland: An Interna-
tional Test of Symbolic Politics, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 335, 339-45 (1986).
109 Austin Cline, Iceland: Religious Freedom Report (2002), http://atheism.about.com/
library/irf/irf02/blirf_iceland.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
110 Ake Westerlund, Victim of Casino Economy, SOCIALIST WORLD (Oct. 10, 2008), http://
www.socialistworld.net/doc/3274.
111 Paul Nikolov, Casino Drama Continues:”We Have Gullfoss and Geysir and Not Much
More,” THE REYKJAVIK GRAPEVINE (Feb. 10, 2010), http://grapevine.is/News/ReadArticle/
Casino-Drama-Continues [hereinafter Nikolov, Drama Continues].
112 Id.; See also Casino Plans Divide Iceland, Gambling Compliance (Feb. 12, 2010), http:/
/www.gamblingcompliance.com/node/41300.
113 Nikolov, Drama Continues, supra note 111.
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from the Minister of Health who feared it would result in more addictive
behaviors.114
There are several veto factors from the Worldwide Veto Model present in
Iceland.  Their force is strong.  First, the island is quite removed from other
locations that have casinos.  Second, there are concerns over addictive behav-
iors of the local population.  Third, rival interests including many bars as well
as a lottery establishment (with gambling machines) all seem to be lined up
against the proposition of legalizing full-scale casinos.  Casinos will not be
coming soon to Iceland.
VII. INDIA
India is the second most populous country in the world with 1.1 billion
people.115  India is a very poor country.  Over 40% of its population may be
classified as “poor.”116  However, a rapidly growing middle class consists of
two hundred million people.117  Poverty has been a major factor in the coun-
try’s decision to outlaw most forms of gambling.118  The Public Gambling Act
of 1867 was passed while the British had rule over India’s politics.119  The Act
applied to all games with the exception of private games and games of skill.120
Over the years, horse racing developed with betting considered a skilled
activity.121
A new federal act was passed in 1998, which permitted each of India’s
twenty-eight states to create lotteries; fourteen states have done so.122  Lottery
drawings may not take place more than once a week.123  Casino gambling has
been banned nationwide since 1867, but the 1998 law opened the door for
states to permit the activity.124  The states of Goa and Sikkim, both of which
were under foreign influence until the mid-twentieth century, now permit lim-
114 Paul Nikolov, A Casino in Iceland?, THE REYKJAVIK GRAPEVINE (Feb. 8, 2010), http://
www.grapevine.is/News/ReadArticle/Casino-in-Iceland [hereinafter Nikolov, A Casino in
Iceland].
115 India, WORLDSTATESMEN.ORG, http://worldstatesmen.org/India.htm (last visited Sept.
16, 2011).
116 Revised Poverty Estimates: What Does This Mean for India?, THE WORLD BANK, http://
www.worldbank.org.in (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
117 Oxford Analytica, India, Middle-Class Nation?, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.
forbes.com/2010/09/07/india-economic-reform-prosperity-markets-economy-oxford-
analytica-middle-class.html.
118 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 364.
119 The Public Gambling Act, Act No. 3 of 1867, INDIA CODE (1867), available at http://
www.dhudhisaqilawassociates.com/major_criminal_laws/Public%20Gambling%20Act%201
867.pdf.
120 Id. § 12.
121 India Gambling, WORLD GAMBLING REV., http://www.onlinecasinosuite.com/gambling/
india/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
122 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 364.
123 The Lotteries (Regulation) Act No. 17 of 1998 § 4(h), INDIA CODE (1998), available at
http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/LotteriesAct-1998.pdf.
124 Id. § 1(2).
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ited forms of casino gaming.125  Other states have defeated the efforts.126
Moreover, hopes for casinos in union territories under federal rule in the Kash-
mir region were dashed as bombings and violence erupted in the area where
India and Pakistan have long disputed control.127
The two states with limited casino gaming are Sikkim and Goa.  Sikkim
was ruled as a separate British protectorate from 1861 until the time of Indian
independence in 1947.128  At that time, the British gave India control over the
remote area in the far northeast, which borders China, Nepal and Bhutan.  Sub-
sequently, India ruled it as a territory.129  In 1975, Sikkim became a state.130  In
2004, Sikkim passed state casino legislation, but a casino was not licensed until
2008 when gaming began in a four star hotel.131  Near the Chinese border, the
casino is the only land-based casino in India.132  However, only persons hold-
ing foreign passports are allowed to gamble.133
Goa was a Portuguese colony on the west coast of India for 450 years; in
1961, 40,000 military troops from India took possession of the land.134  India
governed Goa as a “union territory” until 1987, when it became one of the
country’s twenty-eight states.135  By 1987, Goa had a new reputation for its
nightlife and its alternative “hippie” lifestyle, which added to its established
reputation as a land of temples and world heritage architectural sites.136
Local authorities welcomed tourists, but they also had to maintain a bal-
ance with the desires of the central government, which were strongly influ-
enced by Hindu religious traditions.  Therefore, they passed a law in 1976 that
prohibited all gambling.137  After achieving full statehood however, Goa
allowed slot machine gaming in five-star hotels.  Machines may simulate black-
jack, baccarat, and roulette games, but there may be no live dealers.  In 1996,
the state authorized table games and machines on ships.138  However, when the
law was implemented in 1997, only the machines were allowed.139  In 2001,
tables with live dealers were permitted for the M.V. Carvela, a ship, which was
located just off of the shore near the main city of Panji.140  The operator pays
125 Sikkim All Set to Roll its Roulette for Great Gamblers, INDIAN REALTY NEWS, http://
www.indianrealtynews.com/real-estate-india/sikkim-all-sest-to-roll-its-roulette-for-great-
gamblers.html?wpmp_switcher=mobile (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
126 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 364.
127 Id.; see India Gambling, supra note 121.
128 History of Sikkim, NATIONAL INFORMATICS CENTRE, SIKKIM, http://www.wikkim.nic.in/
sws/sikk_his.hitm (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 365.
132 Barun Roy, Sikkim: The Dice is Set – Casino Games Rolls from the Royal Plaza, THE
HIMALAYAN BEACON (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.sikkim.nic.in/sws/sikki_his.htm.
133 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 365.
134 Id. at 364.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.; India Gambling, supra note 121.
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an annual license fee, and the operator charges players a high entrance fee.141
Since 2001, several other ship operators have also begun offering casino
games.142
Among others, religious groups have severely criticized gambling as not
being regulated effectively.143  As a result, efforts to limit gambling have been
enforced through state policy measures increasing taxes on player winnings.144
Hopes that Goa would become a special gambling enclave along the order of
China’s Macau have been set aside for the near future.145
Several factors in the Worldwide Veto Model have retarded development
of casinos in India.  Poverty leads the list.  Violence in the north of Kasmir has
precluded casino development within the region.  Moreover, after the bombings
in Mumbai in 2008, general concerns about violence have put a damper on
development elsewhere.  Religious authorities both from Hindu adherents and
Catholics in Goa have used political lobbying pressure to stop gaming growth.
While entrepreneurs recognize that massive gambling developments in Macau
and Singapore beckon to high rollers from India, neither the national nor the
state governments experience border pressure sufficient to cause them to
respond with the legalization of gaming.  Macau and Singapore are rather far
away.  Also, limited gaming in Nepal does not present border pressures for
Indian legalization; and to the west of India, Muslim countries have no casinos.
VIII. ISRAEL
Located beside the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, the small country
of Israel has only 8,000 square miles of land and 7.3 million people,146 holding
one-third of the Jewish population worldwide.147  While twenty percent of the
population is not Jewish, Israel has been the world’s only western-style democ-
racy that is closely tied to a religious ideology, Judaism.148  The modern nation
began in 1948 as a realization of Zionism—the philosophy that there be a
homeland for Jewish people.149
Israel is a gambling country.  The country has maintained a lottery since
1951.150  However, allowing casinos has been a controversial issue.  With a
brief two-year exception when a casino was permitted in the Palestinian
Authority area, as discussed below, there have been no legal casinos.151
141 Casinos in Goa, MAKE MY TRIP, http://www.makemytrip.com/travel-guides/india/casi-
nos_goa-goa (last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
142 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 364-65.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See id. at 364.
146 Israel, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107652.html (last visited Sept.
12, 2011).
147 ALAN ARIAN, POLITICS IN ISRAEL: THE SECOND REPUBLIC 3, at 1-22 (2004).
148 Id.
149 Asher Friedberg et al., Gambling in Israel and the Jericho Casino: Moralistic Political
Culture Bends Toward Pragmaticism, 5 GAMING L. REV. 25, 25-26 (2001).
150 Israel Lottery – New Lotto, GLOBAL-LOTTERY-REV., http://global-lottery-review.com/
Israel-lottery.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
151 Friedberg et al., supra note 149, at 28.
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Casino gaming may be an important economic issue, but the dominant
issue facing Israel has been national defense.  Jews began serious efforts to
escape persecution by forming their own state in the nineteenth century.152
When the modern state of Israel was formed ultimately in 1948, neighboring
non-Jewish Arab countries immediately declared war.  Israel has since fought
wars with the surrounding nations in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982.153
In 1993, the Oslo Accords provided for peaceful relations between the
Israelis and bordering Palestinians.154  The Accords proved short-lived and
gave rise to the Intifada in 2000, which was largely characterized by pitched
battles targeting civilians.155  As of 2011, those hostilities persist.156
Gaming has deep roots in the life of Jewish people.  Early Jewish scripture
suggests that forms of lotteries were used as a common way for Hebrew people
to solve social and legal disputes.157  Some contend that the first gamble was
by Eve as she picked the fruit from the forbidden tree in the Garden of Eden.158
Others say the first use of a lottery may have been Aaron appealing to God to
help him decide which of two goats to kill for a sacrifice.159  Other examples of
drawing lots to determine how land would be distributed,160 military tactics,
and other public issues appear throughout the Hebrew books of the Bible (the
Christian Old Testament).161  Whether these are examples of “real” gambling is
open to dispute as often there was no consideration offered by players of the
game.162  The goals of Israeli lotteries have changed and they are now aimed at
national targets, such as purchasing land for the public and supporting welfare
programs.163
There are many examples of Israeli gambling today.  There are lottery
kiosks located in every neighborhood selling tickets for the twice-weekly
national game, soccer pools, and instant games.164  The government takes most
of the revenues from the games, and player winnings are not subject to income
taxes.165  Gambling vessels with both slot machines and table games operate on
international waters sailing from Haifa and Eilat.166  Advertisements in Israeli
152 ARIAN, supra note 147, at 1-22.
153 Israel Wars, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., http://mfa.gov.il/mfa/modern%20history/
Israel%20wars (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
154 The Oslo Accords, MIDDLE EAST RES. & INFO. PROJECT, http://www.merip.org/Pales-
tine-israel_primer/oslo-accords-pal-isr-prime.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
155 The Fall 2000 Uprising, MIDDLE EAST RES. & INFO. PROJECT, http://www.merip.org/
fall-2000-uprising (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
156 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 513.
157 See id. at 195.
158 See Bereshit 2-3; see also Genesis 2-3.
159 See Leviticus 16; see Vayikra 16; see also THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 195.
160 See Joshua 17; see Y’hoshua 17; see also THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 195.
161 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 195.
162 The definition of gambling includes three elements: consideration (an element of all
contracts), chance, and prize. Id. at 683.
163 Id. at 513.
164 Friedberg et al., supra note 149, at 27.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 28.
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newspapers tout floating casinos, including the provision of kosher food, and
entertainment.167
A sizeable number of Israelis travel abroad in order to participate in casino
gambling.168  While it has been opened and closed with the changing winds of
violence, a casino in nearby Lebanon was one of the most popular in the
world.169  Egypt also caters to Israeli gamers, offering a casino in the border
town of Taba, to which players can walk from the Israeli town of Eilat.170  In
addition, illegal casinos operate in various locations and receive only occa-
sional attention from the police.171
A survey in the 1970s found gambling to be a more prevalent behavior
among those of the Jewish faith than of members of many other religions.172
An article in The Jerusalem Report carried the title, The Jewish Vice, and the
subtitle, Gambling is the ‘drug of choice’ for the Chosen People.173  Rabbi R.
Bernal Wein writes,
Gambling to too many Jews has become an addiction, no less so than drugs or alco-
hol.  Gamblers’ Anonymous is as busy as Alcoholics Anonymous [in Jewish commu-
nities]. . .The rabbis sensed all of the problems inherent in gambling and thus wisely
attempted to distant Jews from being caught in gambling activities. Playing dreidel or
cards on Chanuka (the Jewish Holiday) is one thing.  Gambling on a daily basis is
quite another matter, one that is contrary to the traditions and principles of halacha
and Judaism.174
The legalization of casino gambling in Israel has been discussed since the
1990s.  During its meeting in 1990, the Economic Committee of the Knesset
recommended the establishment of a casino in Eilat.175  The committee wished
the casino to be operated by the National Lottery.176  A second committee,
meeting in February 1991, also recommended establishing a casino in Eilat,
because the Egyptians were operating a casino in Taba.177  Efforts failed in the
Knesset in 1994 and 1995.178  According to University of Haifa Professor
Asher, the purpose of the proposed legalization was to stem the growth of ille-
gal gambling as well as competition with nearby casinos.179
The national government appointed another committee of inquiry to con-
sider a legal casino in 1995.180  The committee deliberated for five months.  It
167 Id.
168 Id. at 27.
169 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 516.
170 Friedberg et al., supra note 149, at 28.
171 Id. at 27.
172 COMM’N ON THE REV. OF THE NAT’L POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN
AMERICA, FINAL REP. 59 (1976).
173 Friedberg et al., supra note 149, at 27.
174 R. Berel Wein, Gambling, TORAH.ORG, www.torah.org/features/secondlook/gambling.
html (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
175 Friedberg et al., supra note 149, at 29.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Interview with Asher Friedberg, Professor Univ. of Haifa, in Jerusalem, Isr. (June 24,
2001); see PUBLIC COMM. TO EXAMINE THE ISSUE OF CASINO IN ISR., REPORT, at app. 5
(Dec. 1995) [hereinafter ISRAEL PUBLIC COMM.].
180 Id.
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surveyed the legal and illegal options facing Israeli gamblers, problem gam-
bling, economic issues, and before ultimately proposing the development of
legal casino gambling with safeguards.181  The report generated opposition,
most prominently from political parties identified with the Orthodox and ultra-
Orthodox religious community.182  Despite the committee’s recommendations,
the government took no further action.183
A reference point for much of the subsequent debate over casinos involved
a political anomaly: a casino in Jericho, located in the land of Palestinian
Authority.184  The 1993 Peace Accords gave the Palestinian Authority a degree
of sovereignty in much of the former Jordanian lands (called the West Bank)
that Israel had conquered, and then occupied, in the 1967 war.185  The Israeli
government was seeking stability for the Accords, so in 1994 they agreed to a
plan for the Palestinians to put a casino at the Israeli border in the city of
Jericho.186  At first glance, it seemed to be an inspired choice.  Jericho is one of
the oldest cities in the world,187 and the Palestinians had hopes of making the
city a major tourist destination.  Their leader, Yassir Arafat, also maintained a
home there.188  Yet even though the Palestinians established the Oasis casino in
Jericho, no Palestinians were permitted to gamble there; thus, almost all the
players were from Israel.189  Moreover, Jericho is approximately a one-hour
drive from Jerusalem.190
The Oasis Casino began operations in September 1998.  However, it
closed in September 2000 after the Intifada took power.  The casino building
was in the direct line of fire between Israeli and Palestinian combatants.  How-
ever, the Israeli military relayed a message to the Palestinians that the casino
building would not be a target.191  Instead of recognizing it as “off limits,”
Palestinian snipers took advantage of the gesture by sheltering themselves on
the roof of the building and firing upon nearby Israeli settlements.192  After
repeated warnings remained unheeded, an Israeli tank simply moved into posi-
tion and fired on the casino building, essentially ruining the structure.  No lives
were lost in the shelling, but casino activity was over.193
The facility had served to meet the desires of many citizens of Israel who
wished to participate in gambling activities.  Three thousand visitors came to
the casino every day for two years.  Of the casino visitors, ninety-seven percent
were Israeli citizens, while only three percent were tourists visiting Israel.  The
181 Id.  These safeguards included elements such as age requirements and identifications,
alcoholic beverage restrictions, and limited hours.
182 Id.
183 See ISRAEL PUBLIC COMM., supra note 179.
184 Asher Friedberg & William N. Thompson, Politics of Casino Gambling: Israel and the
Palestinian Authority – An Update, 7 GAMING L. REV. 421, 421 (2003).
185 See Details of the Oslo Accords, PALESTINE FACTS, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_
1991to_now_oslo_accords.php (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
186 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 514.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Friedberg et al., supra note 149, at 28.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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average player was middle-class and middle-aged.  Each spent on average $225
per casino visit.194  The casino was very profitable and provided a major source
of revenue from Israel to the Palestinian Authority.  It was the largest, and most
lucrative investment of the Palestinian Investment Fund.195  In its mere two
years of operation, the casino took in the cash equivalent of $1.5 billion U.S.
dollars from the pockets of its players.196  Operating profits amounted to $328
million, or well over 60% of the play.  As their leading source of revenue, this
money financed many Palestinian Authority activities.197
Israeli leaders saw many benefits in the existence of the Jericho casino.198
First, they realized that the casino met demands for gambling among many
Israelis.  The casino drew Israeli players away from illegal casinos and also
casinos in other countries.199  Second, the creation of the Oasis Casino lessened
pressures to establish casinos in Israel–pressures that brought political conflict
and confrontation with strong moral interests as well as members of the Labor
Party.200  Because the Jericho casino was under Palestinian Authority jurisdic-
tion, it muted opposition from those sources.201  Third, the existence of the
Jericho casino allowed Israeli money to go to Palestinians without direct appro-
priations.202  These investments helped to lessen hostility between Palestinians
and Israelis.  The countless jobs the casino provided to Jericho residents
allowed them to build careers that in turn, built a more vibrant local commu-
nity.203  It was believed by many that strong Palestinian communities would be
more likely to wish peaceful relations with Israel, as they would have a lot to
lose in an atmosphere of hostility.204
On the other hand, the two-year existence of the Jericho casino did present
some downsides for Israel.  For instance, there were questions about where the
casino profits went.  Money intended for the community of Jericho and the
Palestinians purportedly went to the Palestinian leader, Yassir Arafat instead;
he may have used the money to plan attacks on Israel, while also adding to his
personal wealth.205
Israeli policymakers asked parenthetically “We have our own needs, why
should Israeli money flow to a Palestinian casino?”  Instead, they reasoned that
if the money went to an Israeli casino in the desert, it would save the outflow of
foreign currency, provide tax revenues, and help the economy of a depressed
region.206  Nonetheless, arguments about casinos were trivial in comparison
194 Id.
195 Id. at 28-29 (citing William A. Orme, Jr., Palestinian Investment Fund, No Longer
Secret, Will Close, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2000) http://nytimes.com/2000/07/07/world/palestin-
ian-investment-fund-no-longer-secret).
196 Id. at 29 (citing INFO. & INVESTIGATIVE SERV., JERICHO CASINO SURVEY (Mar. 2001)).
197 Id. (citing INFO. & INVESTIGATIVE SERV., JERICHO CASINO SURVEY (Mar. 2001)).
198 Friedberg & Thompson, supra note 184, at 422.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Friedberg et al., supra note 149, at 30.
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with other problems facing the nation.  The Prime Minister (Ehud Barak, 1999-
2001) faced more serious concerns: negotiations with the Syrians and Palestini-
ans, troop deployment in Lebanon, and turmoil regarding the funding of relig-
ious schools and activities during Sabbath.207  For all of these reasons, the
prospect of a domestic casino was comparatively low on the list of national
priorities.
Even in this political atmosphere, the Barak administration nonetheless did
consider a Labor Party proposal to create a casino in the depressed Negev
Desert town of Mitzpe Ramon.208  The nation’s first Prime Minister, David
Ben Gurion, established settlements there, directed tens of thousands of immi-
grants to them in the 1940s and 1950s, and chose a desert site for his permanent
retirement home.209  Continued poverty and chronic unemployment of the
desert towns was a national embarrassment.  The proposals did not have
enough support to be brought forth in the Knesset for final votes.210
Despite past failed attempts by others, one prominent businessman kept
pushing for casinos.  Milton Schlaff, who had been an owner of the company
that managed the Oasis Casino, purchased a large ship, and used it as a casino
training facility for dealers.211  He also wished to anchor the ship at Eilat and
gain permission to operate his casino just off the shore.212  Although the Mayor
of Eilat was very much in favor of the idea, the Israeli Attorney General vetoed
the project.213
The demands for gambling in Israel have also been made evident by one
proposal to have a casino on an airplane.  In May 2002, the transport ministry
had authorized a Boeing 747 to be operated by Icelandic airlines with a casino
aboard.214  Israeli investors were prepared to provide as much as $30 million to
convert the jumbo jet.215  Once ready, the jet would take 230 gambling passen-
gers on four-hour flights from the Israel Ben Gurion International Airport out
into the skies above the Mediterranean Sea before ultimately returning
home.216  The plan won approval from the transport ministry; however, it was
doomed by objections from the legal advisor to the prime minister as well as
the Israeli Supreme Court.217
A continuing opposition to gambling comes from a variety of sources
reflecting the political culture in Israel.  Newspapers report both religious and
secular Jewish and Arab members in the Knesset who, while usually in compe-
tition with one another on basic issues of national security and economic pol-
207 Id. at 30-31.
208 Id. at 31.
209 Id.
210 Amir Efrati, MKs Work to Prevent Casinos, JERUSALEM POST, June 17, 2003, available
at 2003 WLNR 229133; see Calev Ben-David, A Gamble Worth Taking, JERUSALEM POST,
June 18, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 228626; see also Interview with Asher Friedberg,
supra note 179.
211 Friedberg & Thompson, supra note 184, at 423.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
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icy, sit around a table and share stories about individuals led to personal ruin
because of gambling.218  A day after the prime minister and finance minister
proposed a casino for Mitzpe Ramon, thirteen government ministers indicated
their opposition and only seven supported it.219  The floor leader of the prime
minister’s party in the Knesset said that he would cut off his right hand before
raising it in support of a casino.220  The plan did not have a chance.
Continued hostilities and violence make it highly unlikely that Israel will
permit casinos for some time.221  Regional violence is the major veto factor
stopping casinos in Israel, although the strong religious sentiment among many
members of the Knesset represents a veto force as well.  On the other hand,
while there is little political concern about protecting the poor from gambling,
there is considerable feeling among politicians that casino gambling in Israel
would hurt many people subject to gambling addictions.  While there is no veto
factor due to a lack of nearby casinos, an underground gambling establishment
might just favor the status quo of no legal competition.  An opposition from the
illegal operators could be a silent veto factor.
IX. JAPAN
Forces in favor of legalizing casinos have been at work in Japan for two
decades.  Members of the national parliament (the Diet) have prepared legisla-
tion, and ten to fifteen sites throughout the country have been designated as
potential casino locations in their plans.222  While legislative votes in favor of
casinos have been tallied, and leaders in the Diet have been on the brink of
bringing a bill up for debate, at crucial moments they pause.223  The word goes
out to the nation through the press, “They are almost there,” but then, the word
is amended, “just wait until the next election is over,” or “wait until the new
Prime Minister is installed,” or “wait until next year.”224  Major decisions
regarding many different matters are made very slowly in Japan.225
A reluctance to decide is imbedded into the national character.  Responsi-
bility is something that is taken very seriously.  Those who decide, become
responsible.  There is only one way to avoid responsibility: do not decide.
Consensus is also prized very highly.  While debates in the halls of the United
218 Friedberg et al., supra note 149, at 31.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 516.
222 William N. Thompson, Gambling in Japan, in CASINO INDUSTRY IN ASIA PACIFIC:
DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION, AND IMPACT 59, 75 (Cathy H.C. Hsu ed. 2006) [hereinafter
Thompson, Gambling in Japan].  Also the author attended a seminar that was more of a
“rally of support for casinos” sponsored by proponents at the Dai-Ichi hotel in Tokyo, Nov.
8, 2011 where proposals were discussed.
223 Id.
224 These general observations as well as those pertaining to Pachinko games were gained
by the author during six visits to Japan, including one sabbatical semester at Osaka Univer-
sity of Commerce sponsored by University President Ichiro Tanioka, which occurred from
1993-2011.  The visits included many interactions with Prof. Tanioka, other academics,
gaming industry and government personnel.
225 See BOYE LAFAYETTE DE MENTE, JAPAN UNMASKED: THE CHARACTER AND CULTURE
OF THE JAPANESE 152-55 (2005).
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States Congress become very acrimonious, and deals are made feverishly in
order to secure the last vote needed to achieve a fifty-one percent majority,
nothing ever comes to a vote in Japanese parliament unless approval is
expected to be nearly unanimous.226  If there is a sixty percent majority, an
issue is not brought up for a vote.  Backroom talks go on until approval reaches
seventy percent, then more talks.  At a critical point, usually somewhere above
eighty percent, the opposition realizes that it may be seen as breaking the pat-
tern of consensus, and may go silently away, allowing the proponents of change
to pass a bill unanimously, or nearly so.  While majorities make noises sug-
gesting they may want casinos, they do not bring forth bills for considera-
tion.227  And so it has been for many years.  The Casino Journal commented in
February 2011 that “legalization of casinos has been reported as imminent in
Japan since at least 2002, and nothing has happened so far.”228  Still casinos
seem to lurk just around the corner.  It may be when the new prime minister
takes office.  Now that a new natural disaster has fallen upon Japan, maybe the
casinos will come after the country deals with the disaster.  On the other hand,
some see the disaster as propelling the casino matter toward acceptance.229
Under the law, gambling is illegal in Japan.  During the nineteenth century
unregulated gambling thrived throughout Japan.  Families were destroyed
through losses of all their resources and even suicides, motivation to work
declined, and there was general corruption of the public morals.  In 1882, the
government finally put its foot down by passing a law strictly prohibiting gam-
bling.230  The law was re-passed in 1907, but with the addition of the following
escape clause: “Provided, however, that, [this] shall not apply to a person who
bets a thing which is provided for momentary entertainment.231
Exceptions to the law came after World War II, as policy makers looked
toward possible economic opportunities attached to gambling.  In 1948, Lottery
legislation was passed.232  A mixture of governmental units—national, prefec-
tural (regional) and municipal—came together with banks to operate lotteries.
The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank gained a leading role in ticket sales.233  In 1996, the
lottery sold the equivalent of $6.5 billion U.S. dollars in tickets, making it a
world leader.234  Their products mirrored those of all other lotteries, except,
226 These are the author’s observations based upon visits to Japan and also fifty years of
graduate studies of political science and academic inquiries into political science as a Politi-
cal Science and Public Administration professor.
227 Id.
228 The Wild Wild East, CASINO JOURNAL (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.casinojournal.com/
Articles/Cover_Story/2011/02/01/The-Wild-Wild-EAST.
229 Interviews with Professor Kazuaki Sasaki, Nihon University, Tokyo, in Las Vegas, Nev.
(Mar. 22, 2011), and in Tokyo, (Nov. 5, 2011).  The notion that the March 2011 earthquake
and tsunami in the Sendi region of Japan will lead to passage of a casino bill was articulated
by many voices at the November 8, 2011 rally.
230 Keiho [Keiho] [Crim. C.] 1182, ch. XXIII, art. 185-87 (Japan); Thompson, Gambling in
Japan, supra note 222, at 59.
231 Keiho [Keiho] [Crim. C.] 1182, ch. XXIII, art. 185 (Japan).
232 Thompson, Gambling in Japan, supra note 222, at 72.
233 Id.
234 Shannon Bybee & William N. Thompson, Japan, in A. CABOT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
CASINO LAW 520.
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interestingly, their major lotto game did not have a single super prize.235
Instead, whenever someone hit all the winning numbers, many prizes were
given to all those coming close.236  For example, in one drawing, seventy-seven
persons were given jackpot prizes, each worth about $2 million U.S. dollars.237
The horse racing law was also passed in 1948, as was legislation for bet-
ting on motor boat racing.238  Japan is the only venue in the world with motor
boat race betting.239  There are twenty-four government-owned courses.240  In
1950, motorcycle racing was allowed with pari-mutuel betting, and bicycle rac-
ing followed in 1951.241  There are six motorcycle tracks and forty-nine
velodromes for bicycle racing.242  Currently, horse tracks are owned by either
the national government or by prefectures.243  The racing event of the year is
the “Japan Cup.”  Betting on the race exceeds total bets on all the American
Triple Crown races combined.244
While these several forms of betting came about with new legislation, the
major form of wagering–pachinko–has had no direct legislative underpin-
nings.245  Instead, police authorities have considered pachinko gaming subject
only to the broad controls of the 1948 Law on Control and Improvement of
Amusement Businesses.246  A pervasive cultural legal fiction promotes the idea
that pachinko is not gambling, because the three elements of gambling are
found missing: (1) consideration (a wager of value), (2) chance, and (3) a prize
of value.  First, players “rent” pachinko balls, using plastic cards to activate
their placement into machines.247  No money is directly “bet.”  Second, players
use “skills”—not chance—to activate a shooting mechanism that propels the
balls around the playing surface of a board.248  Third, if they are successful, the
machine returns more balls to them, and they can exchange these balls for non-
cash prizes.249  However, reality belies the notion that the elements of gam-
bling are missing.  The players advance cash to get the balls.250  They use very
235 Thompson, Gambling in Japan, supra note 222, at 72.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 73.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 74.
243 Id. at 73; see also Kimihisa Kittaka, Toward Rebirth: “Keirin” Bicycle and Motorcycle
Racing to Introduce Private Business Resources, IIST WORLD FORUM (June 3, 2002), http://
www.iist.or.jp/wf/magazine/0089/0089_E.html.
244 Thompson, Gambling in Japan, supra note 222, at 73.
245 Id. at 63.
246 Fuzoku Eigyo no Kisei oyobi Gyomu no Tekiseka to ni Kansura Horitsu (Law on Con-
trol and Improvement of Amusement Businesses), Law 122, 1948, Art. 23, cited in I. TANI-
OKA, PACHINKO AND THE JAPANESE SOCIETY 80 (2000).
247 Thompson, Gambling in Japan, supra note 222, at 73; Eric C. Sibbitt, Regulating Gam-
bling in the Shadow of the Law: Form and Substance in the Regulation of Japan’s Pachinko
Industry, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 568, 569 (1997).
248 Thompson, Gambling in Japan, supra note 222, at 73; Sibbitt, supra note 247, at 569.
249 See Thompson, Gambling in Japan, supra note 222, at 73; Sibbitt, supra note 247, at
569.  Author’s personal tour of Hinomara and P-Ark Pachinko Parlors of Kawasaki and
Tokyo, in Kawasaki and Tokyo, Japan (Apr. 4-5, 1995).
250 Thompson, Gambling in Japan, supra note 222, at 73.
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little skill to activate the balls (although there is some skill in finding machines
that may have boards that are more friendly for returning more balls than
played).251  Ultimately, the players take their non-cash prizes outside of the
pachinko halls where they are exchanged for cash.252
Pachinko became popular in Japan for reasons that keep pachinko play
uniquely Japanese.  The game is a spin-off of a game developed in the United
States in the 1920s.253  The American game was played on a horizontal board
at a tilted angle.  Balls—typically marbles—were “shot” upward (actually out-
ward) and fell down a slope into areas where they would be judged to be win-
ning or losing balls.254  Over time the game developed into what are now called
pinball machines.255
The game idea came to Japan in the 1930s where it was adapted to the
lack of space in commercial amusement centers.  While American pinball
machines are six feet in length and three feet in width,256 the pachinko board is
vertical, requiring only two feet of lateral space.  At first, the game was played
only for amusement.  The game became very popular, but during World War II,
it was discouraged as it was considered a waste of valuable time, which could
otherwise be spent on wartime pursuits.  In addition, the pachinko machines
used parts and metals (especially the balls), which were needed for the war
effort.257  The machines were also seen to be devices that would waste valuable
time that should be spent in more meaningful and productive pursuits.258
After World War II, new incentives made pachinko popular once again.
There were certain shortages, and there were certain surpluses.259  While Japan
had an active manufacturing sector during the war, the Allies sustained bomb-
ing campaigns that destroyed a significant number of Japanese factories.260
The result was that Japan faced certain shortages of manufactured products.261
Interestingly though, they found that an essential element in their machinery—
the ball bearing—was not destroyed.  In fact, they had a surplus of millions of
ball bearings, for which they had no practical use.262  In response, manufactur-
ers started making pachinko machines to specifications that could use the ball
bearings, essentially manufacturing a demand for something that was otherwise
useless.263
251 William N. Thompson, Japan and Pachinko, in GAMBLING IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF HISTORY, ISSUES, AND SOCIETY 202, 203-04 (2001) [hereinafter Thompson, Japan
and Pachinko]; Thompson, Gambling in Japan, supra note 222, at 64.
252 Thompson, Japan and Pachinko, supra note 251, at 203-04; Sibbitt, supra note 247, at
569.
253 Thompson, Japan and Pachinko, supra note 251, at 203.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Thompson, Gambling in Japan, supra note 222, at 70.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
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Manufacturers also began to finance pachinko halls.  The American army
supported those decisions.264  Indeed, the Americans and the Japanese sup-
ported any productivity that led to greater levels of employment after the
war.265  Stability was returning to a “new” Japan.  The pachinko game also
became a device for rationing the items people wanted or needed, all of which
were in short supply.266  Things people wanted included chewing gum and
chocolate, while the things they needed included soap and home cleaning
materials.267  The winners of the pachinko games received these types of
goods.268
With time the economy improved and many of these consumer items
became available.  Machines were no longer needed to dispense the goods.  A
new prize structure was developed involving an exchange of prizes for cash.269
The exchange system offered an avenue for crime elements to come into the
picture.270  The pachinko parlors increased their number of machines to the
average 250 machines at each parlor.271  However, the Japanese economy hit
difficult times, and the number of parlors, as well as pachinko revenues, has
since decreased.272  Today there are about 15,000 halls and over three million
machines.273  Profits earned in 2006 from pachinko exceeded the equivalent of
$25 billion U.S. dollars, equating to an excess of $215 billion U.S. dollars
wagered.274  The average Japanese adult bets and loses double the amount than
the average American at the games played.275
The wagering today in Japan comes almost exclusively from local
residents.  There is no tourism quality to the domestic gambling product.  In the
many decades since World War II, few Japanese have been attracted to casinos
in other countries, although Japanese gamblers traveling to places like Las
Vegas are considered to be good gamblers by casino hosts.276  Due to its island
nature, casinos in other countries are not close to the Japanese borders.  How-
ever, this veto factor is losing its effect, as Macau has undergone considerable
expansion, and new Singapore and Korean-based casinos now look for
patronage from Japanese players.277
Several veto factors do not operate to prevent casino development in
Japan.  For instance, widespread poverty is not a major government concern,
and religion has not been a force in Japanese politics for many decades.  Fur-
thermore, the society is tranquil with little overt violence and governmental
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 70-71.
267 Id. at 70.
268 Id. at 71.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 59.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Interview with Roy Kawaguichi, Interpreter for Japan Tour Bureau and former casino
host, Las Vegas, Nev. (July 20, 2011).
277 See generally Thompson, Gambling in Japan, supra note 222.
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corruption.278  Two veto factors remain, as there is concern about compulsive
gambling and there are those in the pachinko industry that see casinos as a
threat to their livelihood.279
X. LIECHTENSTEIN
Landlocked Liechtenstein is one of the smallest countries in the world,
having a population of only 32,000 people, and a landmass of sixty-two square
miles.280  The nation is the only contemporary country that was owned by a
family.281  It is also the only country named for a family, the Liechten-
stein’s.282  The small principality represents the only remaining monarchy that
was once part of the Holy Roman Empire.  Today, the Roman Catholic Church
is the national church of Liechtenstein.  The Church maintains strong ties to
both Rome and the government of the principality.  The Church seeks to uphold
morality with its influence, and is one force against the legalization of
casinos.283
In 1868, with Liechtenstein mired in considerable public debt, a casino
was proposed to usher it out of its financial woes.  The parliament supported
the project.  However, ruling Prince Johann II nullified the action.  The Prince
then advanced his personal funds to pay the country’s creditors.284  The Prince
vetoed the establishment of another casino in 1872.  In that instance, the Baden
Baden company had applied to open a casino in Liechtenstein following the
closure of its German casino the preceding year.285
Forty-nine years later, Liechtenstein was once more facing financial disas-
ter.  The country had been closely aligned with Austria in the early twentieth
century.  By agreement, Austria controlled Liechtenstein’s borders with respect
to trade and customs, and postal functions.286  In turn, Austria gave Liechten-
stein a handsome grant that often amounted to over fifty percent of its national
budget, and once even ninety percent.287  With the onset of World War I how-
ever, Liechtenstein declared its neutrality, thus siding with Switzerland.  Aus-
tria was not pleased, and as the war took its toll on the country, the grants to
Liechtenstein dwindled, as postal and customs agreements ended.288  The vic-
torious Allies, including the French and the British, also showed no gratitude
for Liechtenstein’s neutrality, and they refused to come to its aid with food or
other needed supplies, during the war or afterwards.289
278 Interview with Kazuaki Sasaki, supra note 229.
279 Id.
280 Liechtenstein, in 17 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 413 (2003).
281 R.MEIER, LIECHTENSTEIN xvi (1993).
282 THOMAS ECCARDT, SECRETS OF THE SEVEN SMALLEST STATES OF EUROPE 176 (2005).
283 See generally HERBERT WILLE, STATE AND CHURCH IN THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTEN-
STEIN (1992); see also DAVID BEATTIE, LIECHTENSTEIN: A MODERN HISTORY 265 (I.B.
Tauris ed. 2004).
284 Liechtenstein Gambling, supra note 4.
285 Id.
286 BEATTIE, supra note 283, at 25-26.
287 Id. at 30-35, 51.
288 Id. at 51.
289 Id. at 42.
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The solution to Liechtenstein’s economic difficulties was a casino.  A sin-
gle conglomerate of Swiss and French finance interests proposed a casino
monopoly, promising generous tax revenues, improvements in roads, a new
tram, and a drinking water supply system290–an offer it could not refuse?  At
least the parliament thought so.  However, once again, Prince Johann II stepped
forth with a counterproposal.291  He would furnish the funds for the needed
improvements—if there was no casino.292  Parliament accepted the counterpro-
posal.293  Johann II had reigned for over seventy years until he died in 1929.294
As a matter of habit, it seems he opened his family’s treasury and paid off
debts, and he personally established new transportation services.295
As the Austrian alliance and trade treaty was now defunct, Liechtenstein
had little choice but to turn to the Swiss for mutual aid agreements.  In 1923,
these agreements culminated in new treaty agreements giving the Swiss rights
to participate in Liechtenstein’s postal system.296  For the first time, Liechten-
stein would have its own postage stamps—money-making products marketed
worldwide to philatelists.297  Under the treaty, Liechtenstein maintained the
right to control internal taxation, but Switzerland controlled the borders and
international customs, and it participated in authorizing Liechtenstein’s pass-
ports.298  Moreover, Liechtenstein agreed to abide by many Swiss domestic
laws.  The agreement was applied generally to all Swiss laws (unless there was
a specific exception); therefore, it included an agreement to abide by Swiss law
not to allow casino gambling.299  The agreement was continuous but after the
first five years could be cancelled by either country with a year’s notice.300
As general economic conditions improved, Liechtenstein found its success
tied to low taxes and very liberal incorporation laws.301  The new economic
formula led the country to mandate its own constitutional provision against
almost all gambling in 1949.302  In the ensuing years, Liechtenstein became the
antithesis of Monaco.303  Rather than having any casinos of its own, Liechten-
stein was surrounded by German, Italian, Yugoslavian, and Austrian casinos.304
290 Liechtenstein Gambling, supra note 4.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 BEATTIE, supra note 283, at 384.
295 Liechtenstein Gambling, supra note 4.
296 BEATTIE, supra note 283, at 51, 53.
297 Id. at 53.
298 Id. at 52-53.
299 See id. at 52-57.
300 Id.
301 ECCARDT, supra note 282, at 180-81.  For example, over the past nine decades, 73,000
companies have established their corporate offices in the country—that is over two compa-
nies per resident. Liechtenstein Gambling, supra note 4.
302 Casinos and Gambling in Germany, THE GERMAN WAY & MORE, http://www.german-
way.com/casinos-germany-spielbank.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
303 See generally THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 455-57.  In the mid-nineteenth century, tiny
Monaco was an enclave on the Mediterranean Sea surrounded by French lands.  It gained
prominence by becoming the only territory in Central and South Europe that permitted
casino gambling. Id. at 456.
304 See generally, THOMPSON, supra note 1 for a discussion of casinos in each country.
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In 1995, Liechtenstein entered the gambling foray as it established a gov-
ernment-run Internet lottery marketed to foreign countries.305  When Switzer-
land authorized casinos in 1994, and then approved their operations in nineteen
locations beginning in 2002, Liechtenstein authorities began to rethink casi-
nos.306  The 1923 Customs Union Treaty prohibition against casinos was predi-
cated on the notion that Liechtenstein would be abiding by the social laws of
Switzerland.  Those laws had been altered.  Moreover, the 1923 edict operated
at first on a five-year timetable with a provision that it would continue on a
year-by-year basis after that as long as neither country affirmatively withdrew
from any provision.307  Liechtenstein could back out of the no-casino provi-
sions when Switzerland authorized its own casinos.
The government set up a parliamentary commission in 1999 to survey the
issue and set forth ideas for a casino law.  Because the government had become
aware of significant money laundering activities in its banks throughout the
1990s, one of the commission’s primary concerns involved the effects a casino
might have on money laundering activities in its domestic banking system.308
There was also concern that very strict bank privacy laws in Liechtenstein
seemed to have opened the door to money laundering schemes for Islamic ter-
rorists to hide and secretly transfer money to their operatives.309  Other
“crooks, crime syndicates, [and] tax evaders,” purportedly did the same, as did
fronts for nefarious businesses.310
Nonetheless, in 2006, the prime minister opened the door to legislation
that could drive casino development.  In 2009, members of parliament pro-
posed a draft of a casino act.311  The legislation will allow the government to
grant licenses to private casino companies.312  Other provisions seem to mirror
policies for the nineteen new casinos in Switzerland.313  Ultimately, the drafted
legislation was not brought forward for a vote.314  One internet source indicates
that it did pass in 2010, but that that the legislation has not been implemented at
this time.315
After examining the factors of the Worldwide Veto Model as applied to
Liechtenstein, we can dismiss several.  First, Liechtenstein has not been a soci-
ety subject to violence, nor have residents displayed personality attributes tend-
ing toward addiction.  Second, gaming policy has not been driven by feelings
305 Casinos and Gambling in Germany, supra note 302; Liechtenstein Gambling, supra
note 4.
306 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 477-81.
307 BEATTIE, supra note 283, at 52, 54.
308 Id. at 305.
309 Conal Walsh, Trouble in Banking Paradise as Uncle Sam’s Sheriffs Ride In, THE
OBSERVER (Oct. 27, 2002), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2002/oct/27/theobserver.
observerbusiness9/.
310 Id.
311 James Kilsby, Liechtenstein Casino Consultation Drawing to a Close, GAMBLING COM-
PLIANCE (July 9, 2009), www.gamblingcompliance.com/node/37613.
312 Id.
313 See Liechtenstein Gambling, supra note 4.
314 Kilsby, supra note 311.
315 Casinos and Gambling in Germany, supra note 302; Two to Compete for Liechtenstein
Licenses, INT’L CASINO REV., May 2011, at 8, available at http://publishing.yudu.com/
A1rz7e/Casinoreview103/resources/8.htm.
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that the “poor” must be protected from gambling.  The present-day residents
have levels of wealth among the highest in the world.  Third, there are no com-
peting gambling enterprises that would otherwise work to block casino devel-
opment.  On the other hand, in very recent years the people have been exposed
to border-area casinos.  But even so, the small population of 35,000 residents is
not a targeted market for casinos in either Switzerland or Austria.  The notion
that the country may be used by criminal elements or terrorist-related elements
for banking purposes, also makes policy makers nervous.  Furthermore, Liech-
tenstein is very much a Catholic country, and the Church’s influence has oper-
ated to produce a dampening effect on casino development.  However, whether
the Church will continue to provide a strong veto force will be observable
through the manner in which contemporary casino development legislation
fares in the national parliament.
XI. MEXICO
With a population exceeding 110 million and an active tourist industry,
Mexico might expect to be a lucrative market for casino gambling; and so it
was during much of the nineteenth century and for many decades in the early
twentieth century.316  Formal casinos came onto the scene during the time of a
French intrusion (called the War of the French Intervention) in the 1860s, and
then flourished from 1876 to 1911 under the government of Portfirio Diaz.317
When liberal forces ousted Diaz from power in the Mexican Revolution of
1911, casinos were closed, and remained so until the 1920s.318  Then during the
years of American Prohibition—the “Roaring Twenties” (also a time when
casinos in Nevada were closed) —it became quite lucrative for entrepreneurs to
establish casinos and nightclubs on the Mexican border near southern Califor-
nia cities and the “Hollywood” crowd.319  Times were very exciting, but unfor-
tunately, government officials overseeing conditions were corrupt.320
A peaceful “Revolution Rekindled,” occurred in 1934 with the election of
reform President Lazaro Cardenas.321  He ousted corrupt officials and exiled
the previous president.322  He also declared casinos illegal and closed them by
presidential decree.323  In 1947, the national legislature ratified the Cardenas
decree by making slot machines and other gambling illegal.324  The 1947 law
remained in effect for nearly sixty years, but governmental authorities never-
316 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 506.
317 Gambling in Mexico, WORLD GAMBLING REV. (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.onlinecasi-
nosuite.com/gambling/mexico.
318 Id.
319 See id.
320 See Andre Castillo, Terror and Corruption in Mexico – Part One, Center for a Just
Society (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.centerforajustsociety.org/2010/01/21/27765/cjs-forum/
terror-and-corruption-in-mexico-part-one/.
321 Jim Tuck, Mr. Clean: The Phenomenon of Lazaro Cardenas (1895-1970), MECONNECT,
http://www.mexconnect.com/articles/310-mr-clean-the-phenomenon-of-lazaro-cardenas-
1895-1970 (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
322 Id.
323 Gambling in Mexico, supra note 317.
324 Id.; THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 506.
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theless permitted licensing of sports betting and pari-mutuel wagering.325
Moreover, a national lottery in operation since 1770 continued.326
Many discussions about legalizing casinos became common among mem-
bers of the casino industry after the 1980s.  However, popular fears that organ-
ized crime, corrupt government officials, and drug cartels would become
involved in casinos hindered their development.327  The politically powerful
Catholic Church also opposed casinos.328
Nonetheless, talk persisted.  In the 1990s, the discussions became increas-
ingly urgent, driven by the country’s worsening economic troubles.329  In 1996,
a legalization plan was put forward in the National Congress.330  The plan
called for ten casinos, one each to be located in a tourist city or border town.
Selected sites included Tijuana, Juarez, Mexico City, Acapulco, Cancun, Cabo
San Lucas, Cozemal, Monterrey, Puerto Vallarta, and Reynosa.331  American
companies rushed representatives to Mexico City to offer proposals.  The Mex-
ican Tourism Agency studied the issue and concluded that the gambling would
benefit the tourist economy.332  As with prior proposals, forces of resistance
intervened just when action was about to be taken, Governmental corruption
and an increasing drug trade was reported in the press, and organized crime
operatives close to the government were identified.333  Congressional leaders
expressed fears that casinos could aid drug dealers with money-laundering ser-
vices.334  Consequently, in 1997, the proposal was not passed by the legisla-
ture, but talks continued.335
While casino legalization has been stalled, a public tolerance for gambling
in Mexico has included bingo hall licensing.336  Entrepreneurs in Mexico took
note as Native American tribes won the right to operate certain gambling
machines.337  Inspired by tribal success in the United States, entrepreneurs
began efforts in Mexico for the legalization of “Bingo Machines.”338  In 2004,
the Minister of the Interior issued regulations permitting the machines.339
325 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 506-07.
326 Id. at 507.
327 Paul A. Lofgren, Mexico, So Little is Known, So Much to Tell, INT’L GAMING AND
WAGERING BUS., Oct. 2008, at 1, 23.
328 See Miguel Kim, Online Gambling in Mexico, FAMILIE KONTORET (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.familiekontoret.net/online-gambling-in-mexico, which reports: “Mexico was
largely against gambling for one clear reason: religion.  The people are deeply rooted in
Catholicism.  The religion does not believe that gambling is a way that God would like His
children to use money and they do not allow it.”
329 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 506.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 See id. at 507.
337 The machines the tribes won the right to operate functioned like slot machines. Never-
theless, U.S. officials declared them instead to be legal Class Two “Bingo Machines.” Id. at
143.
338 Id.
339 Anna Cearley, In Tijuana, Gambling Makes Noise, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 14,
2006, at A1; Gambling in Mexico, supra note 306.
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While traditional slots were still banned, bingo games could be conducted
on freestanding machines.  Thus, the Minister issued a number of permits for
machines located in arcades, bingo parlors and racetracks with sports bet-
ting.340  An eager gambling industry stepped forward to test the luck of the
Mexican players, and racetracks with machines and mini-casinos have since
proliferated.341  American slot manufacturers descended on Mexico to sell their
equipment.  By 2008, 35,000 machines were in use for play in Mexico.342
There are now around 300 slot machine locations.343  False starts had turned
into a real start toward casino gambling.  Moreover, although Mexican law still
prohibits live table games, machine parlor operators have adjusted to this real-
ity by utilizing electronic roulette, blackjack, craps and other varieties of elec-
tronic table games.344
While the Mexican government exercises few controls over the
machines—beyond licensing—a large group of operators established an associ-
ation, which set forth both machine testing requirements and integrity controls
widely followed by all operators.345  It is hoped by the association that legisla-
tion can establish formal rules that can then lead to more widespread gam-
bling.346  Casino industry expectations are that this will in turn appeal to
visitors from the United States.  However thus far, almost all the gamers are
local Mexican residents.347
In 2009, authorities relaxed policies and began allowing regular—class
three type— slot machines for gaming.348  Proposals, which would have pro-
vided for greater casino development, again were scheduled to come before
Congress.  However, this time the crisis generated by the Swine Flu caused the
national congress to shut down the bill before considerations could be made.349
Subsequently the spread of violence due to a growing illegal drug trade
kept forces in favor of casinos from advancing their cause.350  The cry of “wait
until next year,” continues to be heard as casinos appear to be vetoed by cor-
ruption, violence, the Catholic Church, and competition from established bingo
340 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 507.
341 For example, “the Caliente racetrack in Tijuana has undergone a $40 million restoration
and now offers 1,000 machines, live bingo, as well as a race and sports book.  Another large
racino is at the Hippodrome in Mexico City; it has 400 machines.  A racino in Guanajuato
may be the largest machine parlor with 1333 machines in operation.  The leading company
in Mexican gaming is a Spanish company, Codero, which has more than 100 machine out-
lets.  Another Spanish company, Zitto, controls 6500 Mexican machines.” Id.
342 Id.
343 James Marrison, Mexico’s Gaming Growing Pains, CASINO ENTERPRISE MGMT. (Aug. 1,
2011), http://www.casinoenterprisemanagement.com/articles/august-2011/mexico’s-gaming-
growing-pains.
344 Caliente, LAND CASINOS, http://www.landcasinos.org/mexico/caliente.html (last visited
Sept. 14, 2011); see also Lofgren, supra note 327, at 23.
345 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 507.
346 Id.
347 Id.
348 Jeff Blum, At Last, Mexico (Legally) Welcomes Casino-Style Slots, CASINO JOURNAL
(Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.casinojournal.com/Articles/Article_Rotation/2009/12/01/At-
Last-MEXICO-Legally-Welcomes-Casino-Style-Slots.
349 Id.
350 Id.
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halls, which fear that the addition of full-scale casinos could significantly tem-
per their success.351
XII. NORWAY
Norway is a prosperous and peaceful country.  It is the home of the Nobel
Peace Prize.  It rests at the northeastern top of Scandinavia, it has not engaged
in wars for several centuries, albeit it was occupied by Nazi Germany in World
War II.352  Norwegians enjoy a healthy economy with high living standards,
and a very high Gross Domestic Product per capita.353  A politically aware
population also enjoys a government with a highly favorable ranking on the
scale of anti-corruption among nations.  Transparency International placed Nor-
way tenth on the ranking of governmental corruption among a list of 178
nations in 2010.354  The Norwegian Constitution established for a state Evan-
gelical Lutheran religion.  The state church was very influential in political
affairs, especially during World War II, but that influence waned in post-war
years.355
Norway has a history marked by gambling activities.  Yet still, the country
has shown a genuine reluctance to embrace gambling.  Legal gambling was
established with a lottery in 1719 while the land was under control of Den-
mark.356  This short-lived lottery raised funds for charities, and the Danish
King gave land away as prizes.357  Norway then came under control of Swe-
den,358 and gambling activity persisted as those in control took a laissez-faire
attitude toward its existence.359  Playing cards became widely used in the nine-
teenth century leading to excessive play and personal tragedies.360
The national government of Norway gained complete independent status
in 1905.  At the time, the state church and public raised concerns about exces-
sive drinking and gambling.361  There were feelings that protections were
needed amidst national conditions of poverty.362  Thus, Parliament enacted leg-
islation prohibiting such behavior.  For much of the early twentieth century,
Norway’s puritanical society and church condemned gambling.  Moreover,
351 Paul, Mexican Close to Legalizing Gambling, ONLINECASINONEWS, http://www.online-
casinonews.com/ocnv2_1/article/article.asp?id=1902 (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
352 CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS, supra note 40, at 295.
353 Norway – Poverty and Wealth, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nation-
sencyclopedia.com/economies/Europe/Norway-POVERTY-AND-WEALTH.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 13, 2011).
354 TI Perception Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/policy_
research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
355 T.K. DERRY, A HISTORY OF MODERN NORWAY, 1814-1972, at 9, 440 (1973).
356 Lotteritilsynet (Norwegian Gaming Board), Proposal for an Action Plan to Prevent Prob-
lem Gambling and Reduce the Harmful Effects of Excessive Gambling, at 10 (2004).
357 Hans Olav Fekjaer, Gambling and Gambling Problems in Norway (Sept. 12, 2003),
http://www.fekjaer.org/warsaw.html.
358 CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS, supra note 40, at 295.
359 Interview with Dr. Hans Olav Fekjaer, in Oslo, Nor. (Sept. 12, 2003).
360 Fekjaer, supra note 357.
361 Id.; DERRY, supra note 355, at 176-77.
362 Interview with Dr. Hans Olay Fekjaer, supra note 359.
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gambling was forbidden by statute.363  The Norwegian penal code said, “Any
person who in a public place arranges or provides accommodation for gambling
shall be liable to fines or imprisonment.”364  Nevertheless, a lottery received
parliamentary approval in 1913.365  Subsequently in 1927, horse race betting
was also permitted.366
Following World War II, the Norwegian Sports Federation, by law, was
allowed to accept a limited amount of money from gambling.  This led to the
creation of the national lottery company, Norsk Tipping, and to the introduction
of football (soccer) pools.367
The Norwegian gambling market was stable for decades following the end
of World War II.  Then in the 1960s, Norsk Tipping permitted bingo halls.368
In addition, in the 1970s the government lottery introduced instant tickets as
well as the mega-prize lotto games.  Norsk Tipping also gave the Red Cross the
right to operate slot machines, which proliferated to over 30,000 by the turn of
the century.369  Although the Red Cross’ beneficiaries arguably were all good
causes, there was a fear from some public leaders that problem gambling was
again getting out of control, and the Red Cross was contributing to it.370  The
1980s and 1990s also saw a spread of betting shops.  By 1999, per person
spending on gambling approached $530 U.S. dollars a year.371
Concerns about problem gambling prompted both the existing Ministry of
Culture and Church Affairs, and a newly created separate Norwegian Gaming
Board, to act together and prepare a report.372  They issued a report entitled, An
Action Plan to Prevent Problem Gambling and Reduce the Harmful Effects of
Excessive Gambling (hereinafter “Report”).373  The Report noted that although
there were several forms of gaming in the country, electronic games were the
most dominant form played by individuals and the instruments of choice
among problem gamblers.374
The Report revealed that eighty percent of the adult Norwegian population
participated in betting games and about forty percent of those surveyed took
part relatively frequently.375  Approximately 50,000 people in Norway are con-
sidered either pathological or problem gamblers.376  The Report estimated that
3.2% of Norwegian teenagers show clear signs of problem gambling.377  To
363 GEN. CIV. PENAL CODE ch. 298-99 § 29 (1902:10) (Nor.); Id. ch. 383 § 38.
364 GEN. CIV. PENAL CODE ch. 298-99 § 29 (1902:10) (Nor.); Id. ch. 383 § 38.
365 Fekjaer, supra note 357; see also THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 469.
366 The Totalisator Act of 1927 (July 1, 1927) (Nor.); see Lotteritilsynet, supra note 356, at
10.
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 469.
370 Id.
371 Id.; see also Fekjaer, supra note 357.
372 In 2003, Parliament created a Norwegian Gaming Board to have supervisory authority
over all gambling.  Lotteritilsynet, supra note 356, at 6.
373 Id.
374 Id.; see also Not Everyone Has Their Dream come True, NORSK TIPPING REP. at 10
(2003).
375 Lotteritilsynet, supra note 356, at 6.
376 Id.
377 Id.
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address these problems, the Norwegian Gaming Board proposed the following
goals: (1) the knowledge base concerning gaming and gaming problems must
be increased; (2) the number of people developing gambling problems must be
reduced: and (3) the extent of damage caused by gambling problems must be
reduced.378
In light of these goals, in 2003, the parliament moved to limit the number
of machines in operation.  They decreed that the government lottery com-
pany—Norsk Tipping—was to have full control over the machines.379  Parlia-
ment instructed Norsk Tipping to drastically cut the number of machines.380
Moreover, parliament indicated precisely that there would be no casinos in
Norway.381  As a result of that decree, the Norwegian Gaming Board was given
control over all gambling.382  Nationwide, the number of machines in operation
dropped from the peak of 30,000 to 11,000.383  Efforts to maintain restrictions
continue.384
While some veto factors have little to no effect on Norway, others are very
influential.  On the one hand, religion has not been a barrier, as the population
is no longer as strongly tied to church-going activities as they were for much of
the early twentieth century.385  Furthermore, Norway is a peaceful land, pov-
erty has for the most part been defeated, according to international corruption
indexes the government is honest, and the major gaming operation—Norsk
Tipping—does not act as a force seeking to end economic competition within
the country.  On the other hand, there are no foreign casinos along foreign
border areas near Norwegian cities, and casinos in Sweden, Denmark, and Ger-
many are not readily accessible.386  In addition, there is a strong perception that
the population is susceptible to addictive behaviors.  Thus, casinos would only
encourage bad outcomes for many in the population.
378 Id. at 7.
379 Id. at 11; see also THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 469.
380 Lotteritilsynet, supra note 356, at 11; see also THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 469.
381 Lotteritilisynet, supra note 356, at 11; see also THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 469.
382 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 469.
383 Id.
384 Id.; I.J.Bakken, Norway: Slot Machines and Problem Gambling, Presentation to the
European Association of Gambling Studies, Vienna, Austria (June 25, 2010).
385 DERRY, supra note 355, at 440; Ingvill Thorson Plesner, State Church and Church
Autonomy in Norway, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (Gerahard Roberts
ed. 2001), available at http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID=
3854 (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
386 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 485.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
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The review of gambling developments in ten nation venues without casi-
nos today suggests the veracity of the Worldwide Veto Model.  This article
offers a model, which has been used to explain public decision-making on the
issue of legalization of casino gambling.  It was called the “Veto Model” as it
was applied to explain the results of campaigns for casinos in a multitude of
American states from the 1960s through 1990, and in addition to decisions on
the casino question in Ireland over the past three decades.  Here the model is
called the “Worldwide Veto Model.”  It builds upon the veto factors influenc-
ing casino development in Ireland, and in turn is applied to that country and
nine others.  The ten case studies look at how seven veto factors may have
influenced decisions to ultimately reject casino development in each venue.
The notion inherent in the “Worldwide Veto Model” is that the presence
of one or more strong veto factors in any jurisdiction will result in negative
decisions on legalization.  The rejection will occur even if many or most of the
veto factors are absent.  The model manifests itself with results similar to those
found in the study of casino legalizations in American state venues.
In applying the model in the ten case studies presented here, what emerges
is unanimous rejection of casinos.  At least two of the worldwide veto factors
are present in nine of the venues.  One strong factor is present in the other.  At
the same time, a majority of veto factors are found in only three of the ten case
studies—Ireland, India, and Mexico.  In seven of the ten venues, a majority of
the factors are absent—Bhutan, Brazil, Iceland, and Israel.  Each of these
venues has three factors present and four missing.  In Japan and Norway, two
factors are present and five are missing, while in Liechtenstein only one factor
remains today.
This revelation strongly suggests that the notion of the veto strength of the
factors overcomes the idea that policy makers are subject to a rival model—
called the “Gravity Model.”  This rival model is not used in our analysis; how-
ever, it was discussed in Dombrink and Thompson’s The Last Resort, as in
American politics it was seen to have application to proposals for other gam-
bling such as lotteries and horseracing.387  In such a rival model, policy makers
would in essence weigh all factors together and take positions in the direction
387 DOMBRINK & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 131, 164-65, 186-87.
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suggested by their cumulative weight.388  In such a rival “Gravity Model”, four
positive factors would outweigh three negative factors.389
Several factors stand out as the most salient.  In seven venues, religion is a
force against legalization—the Hindu faith in India, Judaism in Israel, and
Catholicism in Ireland, Brazil, Liechtenstein, and Mexico.  Six venues have the
“passive” veto factor of having no other casino venue on their borders or close
to their population centers.  These are Bhutan, Iceland, India, Japan, and Nor-
way.  Until Switzerland legalized casinos recently, Liechtenstein also had this
factor.  Competitive entertainment forces are present in six venues (Bhutan,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, and Mexico).  Poverty appears as a worldwide
veto factor in one-half of the venues: Ireland (in the past), Bhutan, Brazil,
India, and Mexico.  Fears of addiction appear as a factor in four venues (Ire-
land, Iceland, Israel, and Norway).  Sensitivity toward political corruption
appears in three (Ireland, Brazil, and Mexico), as does the violence factor (Ire-
land—in the past, India, and Mexico).
The case study of Ireland shows that shifting conditions among the veto
factors can keep the question of legalization on the active political agenda.  In
many jurisdictions—Japan being the leading case—a consensus must be
reached before major decisions can be made in that public arena.  This condi-
tion seems to apply to the issue of legalization of casinos while it does not
apply to all decisions on all questions concerned with gambling issues—for
example, “should we have a lottery?”  Casinos are considered differently.  They
are major commercial institutions carrying a special symbolism for communi-
ties.  They give a label to a community as they have a special attraction for
gamblers with their continuing action (which is quite different from lottery
play, or betting on horse races).  That continuing action can also be a draw for
corrupt elements of society, especially when those elements are found in gov-
ernment.  The image of a casino is such that policy makers seem to be very
careful when they offer approval for legalization.  In fact, the nature of the
political decision-making process and the need for consensus—as illustrated in
the Japan case—further support the validity of the Worldwide Veto Model.
Therefore only a few veto factors—or simply one strong veto factor—are nec-
essary for venues to say “No” to casinos.
388 Id.
389 Id.
